In my article I draw attention to the illogical nature of the belief in free will (1) . If I understand the letter from McEvoy correctly, he does not dispute this conclusion (2) . Rather, he addresses the difficulties in administering justice under a system in which it is conceded that free will is lacking. Although I agree that there are difficulties, I have provided an outline for an alternative form of justice. The option of remaining with the present system is not an attractive one for several reasons, including the following: The system does not work well, especially here in the United States where we have the highest incarceration rate in the world (3) . Also, it is absurd to expect jurors, in response to competing arguments from so-called experts, to make decisions about the degree of mental responsibility of defendants. This absurdity will only increase with ongoing advances in the study of behavioral biology that result in an increasing understanding of human behavior at the level of the chemistry of the brain. This behavior, in turn, reflects nothing more than the genetic and environmental history of the individual, plus some degree of stochasticism.
I have argued that a belief in free will is nothing other than a continuing belief in vitalism and, as such, for scientists to passively accept this belief is an embarrassment to the field of biology. The widespread notion, present in both the scientific community and university administrations, that there is some magical component to human behavior only serves to hinder research in an area that has to be among the most fascinating and important in all of biology. Furthermore, defining the real basis of human behavior (and eliminating the notion of free will) should increase attention on the importance of creating environmental conditions, both within prisons and outside, which minimize antisocial behavior. At present, such attention is diluted by the mistaken belief that individuals possess some level of control of their behavior, over and above that defined by their genetic and environmental history.
Finally, I would encourage those who strongly disagree with the arguments that I have presented to provide a molecular model for free will. In the meantime, it would be prudent for society to assume that no such model will be forthcoming and that the illusion of free will is a genetically driven evolutionary twist of nature, imposed on us through our conscious mind. We should modify the judicial system accordingly. 
